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Abstract 
This paper identifies how three dominant ideas of international law (as a process, an 
institution and a practice) see its agency, concluding that all three share a reluctance 
to see international law as doing anything more than enabling the operation of other 
actors, forces or structures. This paper argues that we should see international law 
as a structure because it possesses both the surface structure of rules, principles, 
processes, personnel and material elements of the international legal system and a 
deep structure of values that sits deep within our subconscious. As Shklar’s idea of 
legalism shows us, legalism plays a powerful role in shaping all our understandings 
of ourselves and the world that surrounds us. Seeing international law as a structure 
enables us to see how it locates actors within a social hierarchy and how it behaves 
in similar ways to recognised structures like capitalism and racism.  
 
Introduction 
The debate over the power of international law has been a defining feature of 
international legal theory and International Relations (IR) theory accounts of 
international law (IL) for over two decades.1 The two disciplines’ very different 
conceptions of power has been a source of conflict and confusion. As Bianchi notes 
that political scientists accuse international legal theorists and lawyers of being 
‘inattentive to the element of power. Lawyers, in turn, would retort that the authority 
of law must be distinguished from the force of power. It would perhaps help both 
sides to realize that law is power’.2 This paper argues that before this is possible, we 
must first work out what international law’s agency is: what types of agency does it 
have? Is it an actor? Can it have an independent effect on events? First of all, 
however, agency itself must be defined. For the purpose of this paper, agency is 
defined as the ability of an actor to exert influence, affect the outcome of a process 
or event, to make happen or prevent an event or action.3 ‘Actor’ here is not restricted 
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to humans but can include non-humans.  Drawing upon Actor-Network Theory 
(ANT), we speak of ‘actants’. An actant is anything that is ‘granted to be the source 
of action’4 and there is no assumption that an actant must be human and so the 
notion of what it means to ‘act’ is broadened. Seeing actants as possessing agency 
is central to the argument that international law has agency and will be expanded 
upon below. 
 
This paper outlines three of the most common ways of understanding international 
law that are common in the IR/IL literature and teases out their, often implicit, ideas 
of international law’s agency. The first sees international law is as a channel, the 
second as an institution, and the third as a practice.5 The paper then goes on to 
argue that these different ways of understanding international law fail to see the true 
extent of its causal power. Despite the negative perception of structures held by 
most mainstream thinkers in IR-IL, there are important benefits to be gained from 
seeing international law as a structure. This is more than just a heuristic device, 
however. Viewing international law as a structure enables us to see the full extent of 
international law’s agency and thereby offers a more accurate and nuanced account 
of what international law can and does do. 
 
1. International law as a process: expanding law’s agency 
Bianchi, while entering the usual caveats about the diversity and complexity of 
international legal theory, offers a definition of a ‘classical international legal 
positivism’:  
‘international law is a system of objective principles and neutral rules that 
emanate from States’ will, either directly through treaty or indirectly through 
custom, and…States are the primary subjects of the international legal 
order…a strict test of legal validity must be passed for a rule to be conceived 
as a binding rule of law, and …extra-legal considerations (economic, social, 
moral, or political) are alien to legal analysis’.6 
The twentieth century’s rejection of such black-letter views of law saw a gradual 
widening of law’s ontology, in two respects. First, it widened the scope of 
international law beyond the state and beyond the rules and principles. Second, it 
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saw extra-legal considerations as playing an important role. As the ontology of law 
widened, so too did the assessment of law’s agency.  
 
For process scholars, the traditional understanding of international law as rules and 
principles is too narrow and misses out important questions about how those rules 
come to be and how they function in practice. Shifting international law’s ontology 
from rules to process has significant repercussions. Most significantly, analysis must 
start much earlier by looking at how and why particular legal rules emerge in the 
form they do. Analysis must also be much broader, seeing legal rules as just one of 
several elements which can explain state behaviour.7 It is not simply the legal rules 
that we should study, but the process of how those rules come to be and the process 
of their application and interpretation. Chayes’ seminal text on the Cuban Missile 
Crisis rewrote how both international legal thinkers and IR theorists understood 
international law. It also changed how international law’s agency was and continues 
to be understood. Instead of seeing international law as acting as a constraint on 
action – a very high bar which is rarely cleared, Chayes argues that international 
law’s power operates in less obvious ways. Firstly, it functions as a basis for 
justification or legitimation for action. For Chayes, legal justification is a particularly 
persuasive form of justification because it must proceed in terms of ‘more or less 
universal and generalised criteria’.8 This means that the public find them more 
persuasive than non-legal or purely political justification. Secondly, it provides the 
organisational structures, procedures and fora in which decisions are made.9 This is 
particularly true of international politics where international organisations are, in 
Chayes’ words, ‘dominated by legalistic modes of procedure’…[and thus are] 
‘responsive to legal argumentation and acting by law-created processes’.10 
 
Thirdly, it is seen as providing accountability – a much prized political value for 
Chayes. This ability to provide accountability, and to be the arbiter, allows 
international law to occupy a powerful place in international politics by being able to 
stand apart from (and above) it. Finally, much of law’s agency comes from the 
omnipresence of law and the legal mindset. International fora are legally constituted 
bodies, often with an explicit legal dimension or purpose. Moreover, the presence of 
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lawyers in international politics, as well as the prevalence of legal education amongst 
decision-makers and staff at NGOs and international institutions, brings the legal 
mindset into international politics further still. It is not only that so many actors are 
legally trained, but that the method itself is also seen as a highly persuasive (and 
hence appealing) form of justification, both for elite political actors and their 
audiences. Law’s agency comes from its omnipresence in the institutional structure 
of international politics, in the personnel of international politics, and in the 
perception of legal reasoning and the law as particularly persuasive forms of 
justification.  
 
So, what conclusions can we draw about international law’s agency? Importantly, 
international law is not seen as a ‘superego setting outer limits to permissible 
action’;11 its influence does not operate in terms of ‘yes or no’, but lies in its role in 
defining and shaping possible actions.12 It is, in other words, a channel, making 
certain outcomes more or less likely but not definitively causing them.  International 
law here lacks direct causal power. As Chayes is keen to point out, international law 
does not definitely decide what a state can and cannot do. Instead, it frames the 
options, making some more appealing than others.  
 
2. Law as an institution 
Institutional accounts of international law fall into two camps. First, there are 
accounts which focus on formal institutions which are specific, concrete and usually 
formally designed. These are narrowly focused on formal, treaty-based law and see 
international law’s agency as minimal. This paper will instead focus on accounts that 
see international law as a ‘broad social phenomenon deeply embedded in the 
practices, beliefs, and traditions of societies, and shaped by interaction among 
societies’.13 For the English School, international law is a social institution, rather 
than a formal one: ‘an established custom, law, or relationship in a society or 
community’14, or, in Bull’s words, ‘a set of habits and practices shaped towards the 
realisation of common goals…an expression of the element of collaboration among 
states in discharging their political functions – and at the same time a means of 
sustaining this collaboration’.15 This is not to say that the English School is 
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uninterested in formal institutions. Rather, it sees formal institutions as secondary 
institutions which are the manifestation of (arguably, more interesting and powerful) 
primary institutions which ‘represent fundamental underlying norms, and are more 
evolved than designed’.16 Secondary institutions are ‘relatively specific, concrete, 
and usually designed (mainly intergovernmental organizations and regimes)’. 17 It is 
primary institutions which exert more power because they constitute the foundations 
of international society, including secondary institutions. 
 
Crucially, international law is seen by English School thinkers as one of international 
society’s primary institutions.18 However, not all primary institutions are equal: certain 
institutions determine others. For James, Holsti and Jackson, this is sovereignty and 
international law is derivative of it. Buzan’s notion of nesting is helpful in explaining 
how different types of primary institution relate to each other. He argues that some 
primary institutions:  
contain…, or generat[e]… others. International law, for example, can be seen 
as a general institution, a set of fundamental principles, and also as the 
container of the potentially endless particular laws about a wide variety of 
specific issues that can be built up within it, and which mostly fall under what I 
have labelled here as secondary institutions.19  
But for Buzan, ‘the trick is to find primary institutions that stand alone’,20 deriving 
from no other institution and international law is not one of them. For Buzan, 
international law derives from sovereignty. This means that while international law 
has some agency, it is not a master institution (Buzan’s hierarchy being: master, 
primary, and secondary institutions). The master institutions are: sovereignty, 
territoriality, diplomacy, balance of power, equality of people, inequality of people, 
trade, and nationalism.21 This means that international law for Buzan is a derivative 
primary institution, deriving from sovereignty.22 International law in turn produces 
secondary institutions for Buzan, such as regimes and international courts.23 So, we 
see a reticence to see international law as possessing a particular type of agency: 
the normative power to shape values, a kind of master value from which others 
derive despite a recognition of international law’s significance. This is combined with 
the belief that independence is a key marker of agency and that international law 
falls short here because of the belief that it derives from sovereignty. So, while the 
English School expands international law’s agency by recognising the role it plays, 
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we are still a long way from seeing international law as possessing significant 
agency or as being an actor in its own right. 
 
Reus-Smit, a constructivist who draws heavily on the English School, again sees a  
hierarchy of different kinds of institution.24 At the top there are superficial institutions 
such as specific regimes like the GATT; beneath these lie fundamental institutions, 
including international law, and beneath these lie international society’s normative 
foundation which comprises three constitutive values: a shared belief in the moral 
purpose of centralised political organisation, an organising principle of sovereignty, 
and a norm of pure procedural justice.25 But it is the shared belief in the moral 
purpose of the centralised political organisation that is the core of this normative 
complex and it ‘provides the foundations for’ the other two.26 Again, international 
law’s agency is limited. 
 
While a norm of pure procedural justice is derivative of shared ideas about the moral 
purpose of the political organisation, it still has considerable agency. For Reus-Smit 
its agency operates via three mechanisms. Firstly, norms of pure procedural justice 
define the ‘cognitive horizons of institutional architects; they define what is 
imaginable’.27 And so when creating ways of coordinating and cooperating between 
political units, international law colours what decision-makers believe is possible and 
desirable. The second mechanism by which norms of pure procedural justice shape 
the fundamental institutions of international society is that they operate as the  
metanorms that structure the process of communicative action that surrounds 
the production and reproduction of fundamental institutions. Fundamental 
institutions are sets of prescriptive norms, rules, and principles that specify 
how states “ought” to resolve their conflicts, coordinate their relations, and 
facilitate coexistence.28 
Norms of pure procedural justice represent that “higher order values” that structure 
states’ moral dialogue about what the norms, rules and procedures should be that 
order their international society. The third mechanism operates once the majority of 
states reach an ideological consensus about the primacy of prevailing systemic norm 
of pure procedural justice. When this happens, other states who do not have ‘a deep 
cognitive or moral attachment to them’ are still constrained because they are part of 
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a society of states.29 When these states wish to justify their behaviour, they have to 
do so in reference to the system’s primary norms and so have to accept them. In 
other words, if these other states want to play the game, they have to abide by the 
rules that the original players set. We therefore see a slightly different, arguably 
greater agency here for law. There is a recognition of law’s imbrication in the 
international system as well as the impossibility of stepping outside of the law. Here 
we see law as constraining behaviour or acting to locate actors in certain places in 
the hierarchy and compelling certain behaviour (because powerful actors high up in 
the hierarchy drive the ideological consensus). Reus-Smit’s recognition of states’ 
inability to step outside of law is an important move towards a greater idea of 
international law’s agency, one where international law affects actors’ material 
circumstances in a compelling manner.  
 
3. Law as a practice: the minimalist idea of international law’s agency 
The idea of law as a practice has proved popular with theorists of international law 
and IR alike with both drawing upon  social theory and sociology. 30 Several 
approaches use the term ‘practice’  - ‘repeated interactional patterns’,31 to describe 
law but this paper argues that there is a significant divide in these approaches, with 
one side seeing law’s agency as reduced by being a practice, while the other sees it 
as radically expanded. The first, minimalist interpretation of international law’s 
agency includes work by Brunnée and Toope, and Rajkovic, Aalberts and 
Gammeltoft-Hansen.32 The second, maximalist interpretation is found in Gramscian 
accounts of international law, which see law as having a far greater role in the 
operation and ordering of society. 
For Brunnée and Toope it is the process of interacting with international law that 
creates an actor’s sense of obligation, and gives law its agency.33 They argue that 
three elements must be present for legitimate legal norms which exert a sense of 
legal obligation to be created. First, legal norms can only emerge from a context of 
social norms. Second, these norms must meet the criteria of legality which 
comprises eight internal criteria: 
1. Legal norms must be general, prohibiting, requiring or permitting certain 
conduct 
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2. They must be promulgated, and therefore accessible to the public, enabling 
citizens to know what the law requires 
3. Law should not be retroactive, but prospective, enabling citizens to take law 
into account in their decision-making 
4. Citizens must be able to understand what is permitted, prohibited or required 
by law – the law must be clear 
5. Law should avoid contradiction, not requiring or permitting and prohibiting at 
the same time 
6. Law must be realistic and not demand the impossible 
7. Its requirements of citizens must remain relatively constant 
8. There should be congruence between legal norms and the actions of officials 
operating under the law.34 
The third and final element is a continuing practice of legality whereby legal norms 
are created, maintained and altered over time. The social and legal must interact and 
that interaction must be ongoing. The practice of legality is insufficient on its own: it 
must conform to the criteria of legality.35 If not, it is not law and exerts no specifically 
legal compliance pull (though it may have a social compliance pull). As they argue: 
‘The interactional theory shows that a social norm, reflecting a shared 
understanding[,] that meets the criteria of legality is upheld through practice that is 
congruent with the norm’.36 This constitutes a ‘practice of legality’ and ‘it is practice 
itself that grounds continuing obligation, but practice rooted in the criteria of 
legality’.37 
 
Similarly, Rajkovic, Aalberts and Gammeltoft-Hansen see international law as a 
practice and a series of ‘social performances’.38 They use Adler and Pouliot’s 
definition of practice as ‘patterned activity’39 that is attributed social meaning; it is the 
‘‘stuff’ that state agents and other international actors do, on an everyday basis’.40 In 
this way, the number of factors which shape (and are shaped by) the practice of 
legality is expanded beyond the ‘formalist box of doctrinal international law…to…a 
broader plurality of actors and scholarships, and also over a multitude of formal and 
informal international settings’.41 However, where Brunnée and Toope see all of 
international society as relevant, Rajkovic, Aalberts and Gammeltoft-Hansen focus 
on three communities: scholarship, institutions, and policymaking.42  
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Moreover, as Schindler and Wille argue, Adler and Pouliot’s approach overestimates 
continuity and underestimates uncertainty.43 It is also very focused on human activity 
and social meaning, exacerbating Neumann’s criticism that discursively-based 
approaches have focused too much on language and have wrongly downplayed 
material conditions.44 
 
Seeing international law as a practice emphasises the way in which law is socially 
embedded. The legal and the social must interact and this produces a more 
complicated sense of law’s agency because it is no longer separated from society 
and acting upon it. Rather, it is embedded within it and loses the freedom that comes 
from separation.45 Consequently, the minimalist idea of international law’s agency 
sees law’s imbrication in society as a lessening of its agency from the traditional 
black-letter view of law that Bianchi outlines. Its ontology has expanded, and more 
actors are involved, but this also produces more brakes on action.  
 
4. Practice: the maximalist idea of international law’s agency 
The alternative is to see law’s imbrication in society as considerably expanding law’s 
agency by seeing law as deeply involved in every element of government, such that, 
Rajkovic argues, law is a ‘practice of government aimed at directing human 
conduct’.46 This Foucauldian approach shows a clear sense of a driver behind the 
practice. As such, there is no clear dividing line between law and politics. Indeed, for 
Rajkovic, law is a ‘powerful ordering rationality and hence means for government’ in 
the Foucauldian sense.47 The traditional belief in the separation of law and society 
masks what Rajkovic terms as law’s ‘conflicted nature’. Law has an ‘image, lore and 
reverence’, a kind of ‘juridical and legal idolatry’48 which empowers it but reflects its 
capacity to uphold its own legal values even when they conflict with those of 
powerful actors.49 At the same time, law is also an integral participant in rule and, as 
Rajkovic argues, a better understanding of law lies in blending and relating it to 
extra-legal processes and practices.50 
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Rajkovic’s willingness to explicitly address the question of international law’s agency 
marks him out. Here, he turns to Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy of power and their 
category of productive power. To re-state, productive power as ‘the socially diffuse 
production of subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification’.51 It works through 
social relations of constitution but does not do so directly. Productive power is 
important in assigning asymmetric categories of social relations: civilized vs. 
uncivilised, for example, as well as legal categories of civilian vs. combatant.52 These 
categories privilege some, and disadvantage and subordinate others. Barnett, writing 
with others, argues that law possesses productive power.53  
So, for Rajkovic, the Foucauldian idea of law as productive is the most accurate 
because it can show us how international law is a practice and how that practice 
functions as a tool of government or power. The Foucauldian reading of law gives it 
considerable agency, but it remains driven by government, or, presumably, at the 
international level, powerful actors. It is worth unpicking the complex set of ideas 
about how international law works. We see two ideas about law’s agency here. First, 
law is seen as masking both the operation of power, typically understood in terms of 
maintaining an unjust social hierarchy, and as masking its own involvement in power. 
International law is able to perform this masking role because it is central to the 
knowledge/power nexus and it produces discourses of truth by mediating conflicting 
claims.54 As Cutler argues, laws of private ownership and property ‘neutralise the 
commodity system by presenting the communal protection of private property rights 
and entitlements as natural incidents of the rationalised commodity form’.55 This 
means that a system which is ‘inherently inequitable’56 is seen as the exact 
opposite.57 Moreover, the relegation of economic activity to the private sphere of 
civil, economic law minimises and masks its political function.58 
 
Second, law is seen as mediating between power and its subjects, partly by making 
rule palatable but also by providing a method of (limited) redress. Law is increasingly 
called upon to mediate between political, economic and social relations amongst 
competing actors.59 The ultimate source of agency is not found in international law 
but – in Foucault’s depiction, in government and the state, and in accounts which 
apply Foucault to international law, in global governance or powerful global actors. 
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What is clear is that international law’s agency is, once again, limited because it is 
seen as being possessed and deployed by other actors to serve their interests. 
 
Both the minimalist and maximalist ideas of law as a practice focus on individual 
practices and laws. This is because of practice theory’s origins in sociology and its 
focus on ‘following the actors’, and the micro level. As Adler and Pouliot argue, it is 
by ‘zoom[ing] in on the quotidian unfolding of international life’ that we can 
understanding how the ‘big picture’ is constituted.60 As a consequence, this makes it 
difficult to identify overarching values or patterns and, as yet, the application of 
practice theory to international law has yet to attempt this. When practice theorists 
theorise agglomerations of practices,61 we move towards what IR and political 
theorists would call a structure but which they theorise differently: ‘the principles that 
pattern social practices that make up social systems’.62 Schatzki’s idea of rules is a 
good description of law: ‘explicit formulations, principles, precepts, and instructions 
that enjoin, direct or remonstrate people to perform specific functions’.63 They are 
also enforced by those in authority. But rules are separate from practice and help to 
bind practices together. This means that they fade into the background because 
practices are the focus of attention. This idea of rules explains part of law but not all. 
Schatzki also offers teleoaffective structures: ‘a range of normativized and 
hierarchically ordered ends, projects, and task, to varying degrees allied with 
normativized emotions and even moods’).64 This captures the deeper values of law 
but misses out on the ways in which law sanctions behaviour. Latour and McGee 
both see law as a network, mainly because ‘there is nothing but networks’ and law is 
no different.65 Leaving aside the agent-structure debate and the reasons for ANT’s 
rejection of the idea structures, what is important here is how seeing law as a 
network affects our perception of its agency. Without a doubt, this increases law’s 
agency beyond existing accounts which struggle to see international law as doing 
more than merely enabling or channelling. Networks do not just enable but they 
situate actors and constitute identities (as well as being shaped and constituted in 
turn by actors). The limitation of ANT when applied to international law is that law as 
a network is embroiled in countless other networks and is seen as no different to 
them. This jars with seminal assumption common to both international legal theory, 
jurisprudence and IR that law is distinct from other social phenomena.66 Certainly, 
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law and its deeply embedded values does seem further removed from critique and 
challenge than other social phenomena like science.67 This may explain, at least in 
part, why the idea of international law as a network has yet to make any real 
headway in the field of IR-IL. 
 
What practice approaches do do is help us to see the ways in which law helps to 
create meaning and to privilege and silence certain actors and actions by bestowing 
competence. This is law’s power as productive, familiar to approaches which focus 
on the language of law and which reinforces the idea of international law’s agency as 
‘enabling’ or ‘channelling’. Practice approaches also emphasise performativity, 
drawing the eye to humans and away from non-human factors, despite their 
argument that social and the material are equally ‘wrapped up’ in practices.  
 
What practice theory, specifically ANT, can offer is the idea of international law as an 
actant. Seeing law as an actant enables us to accord it a role beyond enabling or 
channelling. This is important because the role that a legal rule plays is important 
and attributing agency to either the actors who apply or interpret it, or to the actors 
who created it, misses something important. The rule is not causally irrelevant but 
existing IR ideas of international law’s agency have difficulty in attributing either 
agency or any particular significance to the legal rule itself. Rather explanation and 
interest lie in the wider political battles in which legal rules are little more than tools. 
 
When we look at international law’s agency we see multiple forms: the law itself 
imposes limitations (like a channel), it colours how we see and institutionalise 
cooperative coexistence (i.e. institutions), it helps to produce our identity and our 
understanding of how to ‘go on’ (like a practice), but it also imposes concrete, 
sometimes physical, restrictions on what we can and cannot do. We must recognise 
law’s composite nature: spoken and written words, beliefs about justice, its physical 
performance but also ‘weaponized city benches, surveillance cameras, speed-
bumps, and steel barriers’.68 In other words, the ‘law-scape’ where law affects every 
aspect of law and is embedded not just in its social fabric but its spatial fabric, too.69  
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In trying to capture the agency of law as a whole, we must see law as a whole and 
as comprising different elements with different agency. Gramscian understandings of 
law get us closer. 
 
5. Gramscian international law 
Gramscian accounts of international law move our estimation of international law’s 
agency on further still, although they need some adaption before doing so.70 There 
are two possible readings of the Gramscian idea of law. On the one hand we might 
read the Gramscian idea of law as limiting law’s agency to being an institution which 
is used by the state and dominant class to maintain their dominance. It is a method 
of maintaining hegemony. This does not differ from the more Foucauldian end of 
practice accounts of law seen in Rajkovic’s work which see international law as a 
tool to be controlled by other actors. On the other hand, however, there are elements 
in Gramscian accounts which point to a more substantial idea of law’s agency and 
which hint at the possibility of the law as an actor in its own right. Gramsci’s praxis 
conception of law certainly comes very close to depicting international law as an 
actant and it is the account which affords international law the most agency. It sees 
legal institutions and ideologies as central to the constitution of the hegemonic class. 
International law is part of the process by which a class or group establishes the 
conditions necessary to establish control, either through force or by ideologically 
capturing popular support as the articulator and protector of the public interest or 
common sense.71 Contrary to the depiction of international law as an enabler, both 
law and capitalism work to order society and the economy and both benefit. As Cain 
notes: ‘Insofar as laws such as constitutional and administrative laws then secure the 
authority of state, the influence of law and state is reciprocal. So too is the influence 
between law and capital reciprocal, for just as law is given its form by capital, capital 
is given its form by laws that enable its accumulation, disposition, alienation, and so 
on’.72 It is not a passive or disinterested actor that has been captured by capitalism. 
It actively participates and, crucially, benefits. When we see international law as 
benefitting from being central to the form society takes and shaping its operation, it 
becomes harder to see it as passive. Thus for Gramsci, capitalism and law 
developed together and it is impossible to have capitalism without law. As Cutler 
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argues: ‘the global political economy is undergoing a process of juridification in which 
a commodified legal form provides the template for economic and social regulation. 
Domestic and global orders are increasingly linked to and disciplined through law by 
the logic of capital’.73 Moreover, we start to see law as a specific type -  the specific 
law of capitalist systems which dominates the globe and international law. It has a 
particular set of values and property is central to it, just as it is to capitalism. 
Moreover, this is not the first time that international law has reflected and spread a 
particular set of values: European imperialism was made possible by a particular 
understanding of international law, territory, possession and sovereignty.74 
International law has a considerable stake in maintaining and expanding the current 
reach of global governance and ensuing it takes a particular legalistic form. But 
international law’s agency here is more than channelling political actions into 
particular legal forms, or of enabling the operation and spread of capitalism. There is 
a synergy between economic and legal values that should lead us to question why 
we see international law as being neutral or value-free. It is not simply that 
international law has been captured by capitalism or that economic values have 
percolated into international law but that international law’s own values are inherently 
capitalist and capitalism is inherently legalistic. It would make no more sense to say 
that capitalism has been captured by legalism than vice versa. If we recognise 
international law as an equal, and equally involved and active, partner in maintaining 
and creating global governance with economics and politics; if we see international 
law as an equal partner to recognised structures, then shouldn’t we see international 
law as a structure? 
 
6. Defining structure 
Structure is a much-used and rarely defined term in IR theory. My idea of structure is 
neither the Marxist notion of an economic structure nor the linguistic notion of 
language as a structure.75 Instead I draw upon Sewell’s clarification of Giddens’ idea 
of structures as comprised of ‘rules and resources’.76 Sewell argues that we should 
think of rules as ‘informal and not always conscious schemas, metaphors, or 
assumptions’77 presupposed by formal rules. These are, in other worlds, social rules. 
Resources, in Sewell’s reworking of Giddens, are anything that ‘can serve as a 
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source of power in social interactions’.78 These can be human or non-human (what is 
often termed ‘material’). They must always be interpreted within context and are 
never self-evident. Nor are they evenly distributed 
As Barnett and Duvall argue, structures define the kinds of social beings actors are 
and an individual’s social capacities, subjectivities and interests are directly shaped 
by the social positions they occupy.79 Moreover, these relations are always 
hierarchical and structures serve to allocate places in a hierarchy. Structural power 
affects actors in two ways: firstly, ‘structures allocates differential capacities, and 
typically differential advantages, to different positions’.80 Secondly, it shapes the 
actor’s self-understanding and subjective interests.81 It can operate both overtly but 
also covertly when it generates ‘the social powers, values, and interpretations of 
reality that deeply structure internal control’.82  
 
Structures, then, are ‘the principles that pattern social practices that make up social 
systems’.83 Structural power therefore differs from the productive power which 
characterises practice theory. Practice theory focuses on the social practices, not the 
principles which pattern them. Finally, a structure is always structuring social roles 
and relations: class structuring politics, gender structuring employment opportunities 
and pay, race structuring development, and so on. Where these structures exercise 
considerable causal power for structuralists, in practice theory they are mostly 
absent. And so, while constructivism, practice theory and structuralism all share the 
epistemological assumption of mutual constitution, constructivism and practice 
theory’s narrower ontology denies structures any significant explanatory potential. 
 
Significantly, structuralism typically distinguishes between surface and deep 
structures, with deep structures generating surface ones. For example, patriarchy is 
a deep structure which generates and structures the surface structure of appropriate 
dress for women in a particular context. The deep structure is ‘deep’ because it is 
more deeply rooted in our subconscious and harder to change: the appropriate skirt 
length has changed over time in Western society but the deeper patriarchal right to 
judge women by their dress, and to discipline them, remains. It is the deployment of 
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men’s superior social, economic and political position (and the material 
consequences that flow from this) that makes this possible. Systemic inequality both 
makes patriarchy possible and is a consequence of it. It is not just ideas but hard 
material and often financial and physical disciplining of women and other 
subordinated groups that allows this to happen.84 And the deeper into our 
subconsciousness a structure is, the more powerful it is.  
 
This paper argues that we should see law, and international law, in similar terms, 
that is, as possessing both a surface and deep structure. Law’s surface structure 
comprises legal rules, precedents and principles. But it also includes law’s 
personnel: everyone who works in the justice system from clerks and prison guards 
to judges and prison governors. It also includes ‘non-professionals’ – ordinary people 
who get caught up in the law as jury members, witnesses, complainants and 
defendants. Thirdly, it includes the law’s procedures: when people enter and leave a 
courtroom, how inmates are processed through the prison system, who may speak, 
when and how. This also has a strong material component: buildings, furniture, 
clothing but also the physical ordering of people within these spaces, like who sits 
where and when.  
 
Alongside this surface structure there is a less well-seen deep structure. Shklar’s 
notion of legalism gives us an excellent account of law as a deep structure. Legalism 
is: ‘the ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and 
moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules’.85 ‘Legalism’ 
is the ideology internal to the legal profession as a social whole but also extends far 
beyond the legal profession to society as a whole.86  It is a way of being in and 
seeing the world. These legalistic values structure both the operation of the legal 
system and our personal morality. It extends far beyond the courtroom and the 
outward manifestations of the law. This means that, for Shklar, legalism exists on a 
spectrum. At times it is openly and clearly articulated and promoted (for example, 
promotion of the rule of law by states and bodies like the United Nations). But at 
others, the deep values which structure most of human relations are hidden and 
internalised. She argues that legalism is ‘both strongly felt and widely shared’87 and 
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as such is deep and pervasive. It is often not articulated at all. It manifests itself in 
social institutions, political ideologies, philosophical thought, common social ethos, 
and personal behaviour. It is an internalised and partly hidden set of social rules, 
which also manifests itself in more obvious, surface sets of social rules. Shklar’s 
notion of legalism therefore fits with the idea of law as both a deep and surface 
structure. What are the social rules which comprise legalism? For Shklar it is: ‘The 
dislike of vague generalities, the preference for case-by-case treatment of all social 
issues, the structuring of all possible human relations into the form of claims and 
counter-claims under established rules, and the belief that the rules are “there”’.88 
The centrality of accountability and the rule of law are two such manifestations. 
McGee identifies an emphasis on rational-legal reasoning, the privileging of law as a 
method of conflict resolution, resource distribution, and organisation as central.89 It 
also changes to fit its context. Writing in the domestic American context, Litowitz 
identifies the following beliefs as central: ‘private ownership of property, employment 
at will, inheritance, freedom of contract, limited liability for business organizations, 
patriarchy, and a regime of negative rights that ensures individuals must secure their 
own health care, day care, and other benefits’.90 
 
Legalism also works to set our cognitive horizons and is all-encompassing. Litowitz 
sees it as a grid, forming ‘a bounded universe of possibilities…This grid will filter and 
frame all legal disputes within its parameters, recasting them in the dominant 
language of the legal system at the time, thereby extending the system…law 
recasts…events in the conceptual grid of the law’,91 in ways that make it fit into the 
grid. So social disputes become legal disputes and individuals become witnesses, 
defendants, complainants and so on. Once a social problem has been fitted into the 
grid, the grid is able to produce an answer, which legitimates the legal concepts and 
the grid itself, and its ability to provide solutions.92 Even if we do not take the dispute 
to law, legalism still frames out understanding of right and wrong, rights and 
obligations, grievance and wrong-doing. As Shklar argues, we cannot separate our 
idea of what is right from legalism. Moreover, one cannot step outside of the grid in 
the sense that it is hard-wired into our consciousness, even if we were capable of 
‘opting out’ of our society’s legal system. Thus, even when the law can operate as a 
site of resistance and counter-hegemony, it can only do so through the forms of law. 
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It must use its language, its concepts, its institutions, its personnel. One can only use 
the tools that law provides: one cannot, in Litowitz’s example, use the law to secure 
universal health care because (in the US) there is no legal right to it. One may be 
able to challenge key elements of the legal system but the price of doing so is 
acceptance of the system as a whole. Even if successful, such acts of resistance can 
only happen once the law has been assumed. As Latour argues, law’s force comes 
from its ubiquity: its ability to link all peoples and acts through chains of obligations.93 
Law ‘judiciarises all of society’.94 It ‘works on it, kneads it, arranges it, designates it, 
imputes it, makes it responsible, envelops it'.95 And the deep structure of law, and 
international law, is always assumed.  
 
And it is clear that many of our ideas about morality, justice and the right way to 
behave are a consequence of legalism, rather than any other structure. Instead of 
seeing law’s agency as located elsewhere, we should recognise that law has its own 
power. It does not derive from sovereignty96 or the moral purpose of the state.97 It 
has its own power and as many have recognised, the legal way of decision-making 
is seen as ‘special’. This can be that the legal principles themselves are considered 
‘quasi-universal or at least generally accepted’, making them ‘well adapted’ to the 
needs of public justification.98  Others have argued that law’s particular form of 
argumentation and reasoning is what explains its uniquely persuasive power.99 Both 
contribute to the idea of accountability – a central strand in the Western political 
tradition – as being accountability before the law. As Shklar points out, legalism has 
a strong preference for case-by-case analysis, seeing it as the most appropriate way 
of understanding and identifying bias and injustice. This focus on individual cases, 
usually involving individual complainants and defendants, is no coincidence: it 
reflects the individualism that is common to liberalism and Western political thought. 
It is certainly not the case that liberalism as a structure is shaping or constituting 
legalism. Rather it is a case of two structures with a shared history, supporting and 
bolstering each other. Neither is derivative of the other. When we view international 
law as acting in similar ways to, and possessing similar agency to other, recognised 
structures, it raises the question of why we do not see international law as an agent. 
International law certainly seems to fit with the description of a structure offered by 
Sewell, and by adding Shklarian legalism, we see that international law does in fact 
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have both deep and surface structures. This belies the argument common to 
process, institutional and minimalist practice accounts of international law, that 
international law is simply a manifestation of other, more powerful non-legal 
structures or actors.  
 
As a consequence, applying our understanding of social norms and the social world 
to the law is unsatisfactory and incomplete. We need a composite approach to 
theorise a composite entity. Existing, implicit ideas of law’s agency see parts but not 
the whole. Process accounts of international law see the power that comes from 
providing the rules of the game; the organisational structures, procedures and fora, 
the language of redress and accountability, and the omnipresent legal mindset. 
Seeing international law as a social institution enables us to see the ways in which 
legal values set cognitive horizons. Seeing international law as a practice (or maybe 
it would be accurate to say a myriad of practices) sees how repetition of action and 
language work in millions of tiny ways to create behaviour. But they struggle to see 
law as an actant. 
 
More significantly, if we see law in parts we cannot see the whole. The composite 
picture of law comprises: rules, principles and precedents, material elements like 
courtrooms and jails, procedures like jury selection or testimony, the personnel of 
law and the ‘ordinary’ people it sweeps up. This is the surface structure of law. But 
we must also see law’s deep structure and the powerful ways in which it shapes all 
our cognitive horizons, not just those of institution-builders (à la Reus-Smit).  Trying 
to imagine an alternative value set to legalism highlights just how central it is to our 
human experience. But law is more than the sum of its parts. When we see law in 
parts we cannot see how law operates to locate us in our social hierarchy and to 
construct our subjectivity. We may see law as the omnipresent rules of the game, 
maybe even as setting cognitive horizons but we do not see it as placing us in 
particular positions or of structuring other powerful forces. 
 
Conclusion 
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By seeking to unearth and unpick the ideas of agency that underpin the most 
common readings of international law, this paper seeks to clarify what we really think 
international law does and is capable of doing. Among the first three accounts of 
international law: international law as a process, an institution, and the minimalist 
idea of practice theory, we can see three overlapping ideas of international law. First, 
law can be seen as reflecting or possessing particular values. Process accounts like 
Chayes’ argue that international law provides accountability, something which 
politics cannot do, and so international law (and law in general) is seen as providing 
a public good which politics cannot. It is one of the actors that holds politics and 
political actors to account. This makes international law a persuasive form of 
justification. These are desirable values and, as a consequence, they provide power. 
They also create the second set of ideas about international law in that international 
law provides a particular way of doing things. It is a question of the practical 
organisation of international politics. So, as both process and institution accounts 
argue, international law provides the organisational structures, procedures and fora 
in which decisions are made. Practice theory’s minimalist idea of international law’s 
agency agrees: the daily practice of global politics is shaped by international law’s 
form. Moreover, for practice theorists, entrenched social practices also perform a 
similar function. We also see a harder edge to international law’s agency here in 
Reus-Smit’s argument that once a consensus is established, those states who do 
not agree are essentially compelled. 
 
But particular ways of doing things do not simply fall from the sky. They are 
manifestations and reflections of a particular way of seeing the world: a Shklarian 
legalism. As Reus-Smit argues, the norm of pure procedural justice defines the 
cognitive horizons of institutional architects and it structures the process of 
communicative action that surrounds the (re)production of fundamental institutions in 
international politics. It is the omnipresence of law and the legal mindset, seen by 
process, institution and practice understandings of international law’s agency that 
gives international law its ability to enable outcomes. International law’s agency is 
productive. It does not directly cause actions to happen (or not). Rather it makes 
certain outcomes more or less likely. It provides reasons for action, rather than 
causes. And so, we see that the three sources of international law’s agency: that it 
21 
 
has particular values, a particular way of doing things, and a particular way of seeing 
the world, collapse into one, all united by the same sense of international law’s 
agency. While each has worked to expand international law’s ontology and agency 
all three stop at the same point: international law cannot do more than enable. It 
cannot make something happen by itself. It has no independent agency, nor is it an 
independent actor. 
 
We have underestimated the agency of law, and international law. We see the tip of 
the iceberg. We see the daily practices, the particular court cases or pieces of law. 
We see how legal education is common amongst decision-making elites. We see 
how convincing legal reasoning is. But we do not see its true reach. We do not see 
how we are all, even those of us who have no legal education, socialised into the 
legal mindset. The idea of what justice is, and that we are rights-bearing individuals, 
is pervasive, so much so that it is hard to imagine how to be in a world where there is 
no talk of rights, duties and justice. It is one of the most deeply embedded and 
unconscious sets of belief we hold. But law’s power moves beyond shaping our 
beliefs. It limits our range of actions by requiring that our social battles are put into 
legal form. This translation inevitably skews our understanding, silencing some 
actors and narratives, altering others and producing particular, legalistic emphases. 
Moreover, it intersects powerfully with and in similar ways to other structures and 
indices of control like gender, race and class. By recognising international law as an 
actant we expand its agency and start to capture some of the powerful effects it has 
on global politics. The essence of structures is that they locate us within a social 
hierarchy and structure our subjectivity. When we hold international law up to this 
mirror, we see it reflected perfectly. 
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